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CHIMEL*
DUANE R. NEDRUD**
WHY AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "CHIMEL"?
Some cases have become household words: Miranda is an ob-
vious example. There are other cases which, while they may not
be commonplace in the sense that they are familiar to the general
public, should be recognized standards for all lawyers and law
enforcement officers. Chimel v. California,' is one of these cases.
If Chimel is not devitalized as it evolves, its impact on criminal
investigation could be more pronounced than any Supreme Court
decision since the inaugurating of the Court's activist era with
Mapp2 which is another of those household words.
WHAT IS SO "PRONOUNCED" ABOUT CHIMEL?
Up to the Chimel decision there had been some fluctuation in
delineating reasonableness of searches made incident to legal
arrests. But Chimel overruled two cases which had been accepted
by the lower courts as exemplifying "reasonableness:" United
States v. Rabinowitzs and Harris v. United States.4 While
Trupiano v. United States,5 a decision which came down between
Rabinowitz and Harris, seemed to conflict with these two cases,
the most obvious distinguishing factor was that in Trupiano
the arrest was made without a warrant, whereas in Rabinowitz
and Harris valid arrest warrants had been issued. A further
factual distinction, one of the place searched, could have been
made by the Supreme Court in deciding Chimel, considering that
Rabinowitz involved the search of an office while Harris and
Chimel involved searches of living quarters. The Court rejected as
"highly artificial" the area distinction (Rabinowitz, a single room;
Harris, a four-room apartment; Chimel, an entire house). Also, in
Chimel there was the matter of an invalid arrest warrant; despite
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Marguerite D. Oberto who assisted
in the preparation of this article.
** Ph.B., 1958, University of North Dakota, J.D. University of North Dakota, 1950,
L.L.M., Northwestern University, 1959; President, L. E. Publishers Ltd.
1. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
4. 381 U.S. 145 (1947).
5. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
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this, the California Court found a lawful warrantless arrest and up-
held the search as incident thereto. These distinctions the Supreme
Court chose to ignore, specifically pointing out that although its
decision in Chimel could be distinguished from Rabinowitz and
Harris and thus so limited, the Court found the Fourth Amendment
permits no rational distinction as to searches without search war-
rants, i. e., searches incident to arrest, which go beyond the "area
from which the person arrested might obtain weapons or evident-
iary items" with the clarification of "area" as being "within his
reach."8
IS IT "UNREASONABLE" TO LIMIT SEARCHES INCIDENT TO
ARREST TO AN AREA "WITHIN THE REACH" OF THE PERSON
ARRESTED?
It could be. Actually, it is necessary to await Chimel appli-
cation and construction by the lower courts. The fact is that
while Supreme Court decisions are in fact "supreme" in every
sense of the word, there is a collective watering down of a Supreme
Court decision, which seems to come about when the general con-
sensus of the lower courts, federal and state, is that a decision is
unworkable if accepted literailly. The decision, naturally, has less
force and effect and thus what might be unreasonable has a way
of becoming reasonable as the lower courts go about fitting the
standard to the everyday practicalities of life, such as the investi-
gation of crime by law enforcement officers. Mr. Justice Harlan,
for example, in concurring with the majority, finds it necessary to
acknowledge a dilemma:
We simply do not know the extent to which cities and towns
across the Nation are prepared to administer the greatly
expanded warrant system which will be required by today's
decision; nor can we say with assurance that in each and
every local situation, the warrant requirement plays an es-
sential role in the protection of those fundamental liberties
protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
7
In dissent Mr. Justice White furnishes other explanations, which
may require an unreasonable waste of effort upon the part of law
enforcement officers who make an arrest where a search warrant
could not be obtained because of the emergency situation and the
lack of law enforcement personnel at the time of arrest to maintain
the surveillance made necessary by the presence of others on the
premises e.g., a wife who, although innocent, might nevertheless
6. 395 U.S. 752, 756 (1969).
7. Z4. at 769.
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require police surveillance until a warrant is issued. Such surveil-
lance may well be necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence
and may well interfere with the liberties of the wife, which in com-
parison would make a search without a warrant far less reprehen-
sible. Also, it has been a recognized fact that the intricacies of ob-
taining a search warrant may preclude the obtaining of certain
evidence due to the inability to "particularly describe" that which
the officers seek to obtain as evidence. While this can be a reason
for requiring a search warrant and is implied by Chimel, yet as a
practical matter some searches may be required for undescribable
evidence, such as written or pictorial evidence, hair, blood, paint
scrapings, safe insulation, etc., which may be imperative for suc-
cessful solution of a crime. In particular, where a valid arrest
warrant has been issued, the privacy of the individual has already
been invaded, so that the protections afforded by a search warrant
may be no more than a means of hiding evidence.
CAN SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST ONLY BE MADE IN
AN AREA "WITHIN THE REACH" OF THE ARRESTEE?
The answer here unfortunately again is the question: is the
Supreme Court to be taken literally? Even among strict construc-
tionists of the Court's decisions, there is a limit to what "strictly"
follow means. The-Court seems to envision "exigent circumstances"
arising which would be exceptions to the rule. The Court recog-
nized the principle that allows the search of automobiles without a
warrant upon probable cause8 because of the mobility factor
(citing Carroll v. United States,9 another case worthy of first name
familiarity). In describing the area of search of an arrestee, *the
Court refers to the justification for search of the area "within his
immediate control" as meaning the "area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence," 10
and then goes on to note that there is no comparable justification
for searching any room other than that in which the arrest occurs,
nor for searching desk drawers or other closed and concealed areas
in the room searches. It is only under a search warrant, "in the
absence of well-recognized exceptions," that such searches may be
conducted. The automobile is the only "well-recognized exception"
listed. But the automobile search is based upon the "exigent cir-
cumstance" of mobility, and it is reasonable to assume that some
of the arguments noted herein and by the dissent would involve
"exigent circumstances" allowing a search beyond the room,
i.e., where there is a danger of evidence being destroyed during the
8. Id. at 764 n. 9.
9. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
10. Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
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time occupied in pursuit of a search warrant. However, any con-
sideration of the automobile search issue nessitates an examina-
tion of the doctrine of Preston v. United States1 (again a case of
common-name import). In Preston the Court held that a delayed
search of an automobile, after its removal to the police station,
could not be considered incident to arrest. The reasoning is: the
need for search had passed because no threat from concealed
weapons or from the mobility of the vehicle existed (which prompts
a right to search under the Carroll Doctrine, supra). But, with the
decision in Cooper v. California,'2 the Preston Doctrine was shaken.
As a matter of fact, the dissent in effect concluded that Cooper
was a reversal of Preston, despite Mr. Justice Black's writing both
the Preston and Cooper decisions. However, Chimel has regener-
ated Preston by citing it (although Mr. Justice Black dissented in
Chimel) and limiting Cooper. Even where nonretroactivity is
not considered, Preston has been found to be the basis for reversing
automobile searches if there is a delay. E.g., see Wood v. Crouse.'8
"We believe that Chimel instructs us that the rule of Preston,
decided prior to the trial here involved, is the law that controls in
this case. Therefore, we need not consider whether Chimel is to be
given retrospective effect.' 1 4 Following the Colosimo reasoning
is Heffley v. Hocker,15 which did not consider Chimel's retro-
activity but viewed Chimel as a revival of Preston and the demise
of Cooper. At least as far limiting as Preston, is Steel v. State.18
The Steel court points to the tenuous application of Cooper which
had relied on Rabinowitz, now, of course, overturned by Chimel.
IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A TREND AMONG THE LOWER
COURTS TO DILUTE CHIMEL?
Up to this time few cases have construed Chimel. Most courts
have been content to find Chimel nonretroactive. (See discussion,
infra.) However, there are examples, as follows, of Chimel's being
distinguished. Over a confession of error by the district attorney,
the court distinguished Preston by the continued occupancy of the
vehicle and the unbroken surveillance, where the defendant-driver
was removed but the other occupants remained therein. Although
stating that Chimel is not retroactive, the court found the search
of the automobile permissible under the Chimel Rule. People v.
Lewis,17 and State v. Klingler, 8 note the "exigent circumstances"
11. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
12. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
13. 417 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1969).
14. 415 F.2d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 1969).
15. 420 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1969).
16. -Ark-, 450 S.W.2d 545 (1970).
17. 306 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1969).
18. -S.D.-, 173 N.W.2d 275 (1969).
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* permitting search: the officer was alone with the automobile when
two occupants were removed, but a third person "might" have
been close by. The search of a jewel box (containing marijuana
and drugs) which was plainly visible and within reach of the de-
fendant was held permissible in State v. Tuck.19 Chimel would allow
search of an entire motel room. The court distinguished Chimel as
involving a search of an entire three-bedroom house, attic, garage
and workshop in Brewer v. State.20 It is reasonable for the police
to accompany the defendant in a state of undress into his bedroom
and under Chimel to seize evidence in "plain sight"; furthermore,
knowing that the defendant had not acted alone, they could check
out adjacent rooms for any potential accomplice and Chimel com-
pliance would allow the seizure of evidence observed in "plain
view."'2 1 The seizure of evidence (after arrest) observed in plain
sight is valid even if Chimel is controlling.22 Under Cooper, supra,
the seizure of the automobile as an instrumentality of the robbery-
murder would be allowed. Even assuming Chimel is retroactive,
Cooper is not rejected.
23
Most of the foregoing decisions are not radical departures
from the Chimel Rule even under a fairly strict construction. None-
theless, considering the short time there has been for the appel-
late courts to have ruled on cases which are not disposable on the
basis of nonretroactivity, they are illustrative of the reasoning
that might be applied. The exception key permitting search is
"exigent circumstances," differing from the moderating courses
the lower courts have followed in cases such as Miranda (accepting
without question the police officer's testimony of warnings and
waiver) and the Wade-Gilbert-Stoval124 identification rules (apply-
ing "harmless error").
IS CHIMEL TO BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY?
The Court expressly reserved the issue of retroactivity (or
* nonretroactivity) in the companion cases of Von Cleef v. New
Jersey,2 5 and Shipley v. California.26 Mr. Justice White, dissenting
in Shipley, objected to the majority's failing to reach such a de-
termination.
To manage the "new" constitutional changes beginning with
Mapp, the Court has evolved a series of "prospective rules"-name-
19. -- Ore.- , 462 P.2d 175 (1969).
20. -Miss.-, 228 So.2d 582 (1969).
21. People v. Mann, 305 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1969).
22. United States ex rel. Williams v. LaVallee, 415 F.2d 643 (2nd Cir. 1969).
23. State v. Carter 64 N.J. 436, 255 A.2d 746 (1969).
24. United States v. Wade, 888 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967); Stovall v. Denno, 888 U.S. 293 (1967),
25. 895 U.S. 814 (1969).
26. 895 U.S. 818 (1969).
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ly, Linkletter v. Walker,27 holding Mapp nonretroactive except as
to cases "not yet final"; Johnson v. New Jesey, 28 holding Miranda
and Escobedo applicable only to cases being tried after the dates
of those decisions; Stovall, supra, holding Wade and Gilbert appli-
cable only to lineups or other identification procedures occurring
after those decisions. There are two reasons which would dictate
Chimel's prospective application only to searches subsequent to its
decision. First, this is one of the few instances where the Court
has stated unequivocally that it reverses past decisions (specifi-
cally Harris and Rabinowitz); decisions upon which the lower
courts as well as law enforcement officers relied and thus warrant-
ing all-out prospective application analogous to the identification
cases. While Miranda analogy is also appropriate, it can be sur-
mised that if the Supreme Court were to decide Johnson anew, it
would choose to follow a Stovall type of nonretroactivity. Johnson
at the time was revolutionary, but it is doubtful that a Johnson
form of nonretroactivity will be applied in the future, except per-
haps in some case (s) which involve trial situations as distinguished
from changes in rules or standards that affect the police officer.
Second, the pressure on the Court to prescribe a prospective ap-
plication will be great, in that to do otherwise might be somewhat
catastrophic by sheer volume of appellate decisions overwhelm-
ingly limiting Chimel to searches occurring after its decision date
(i. e., June 23, 1969) .9
A few courts have leaned toward nonretroactivity but have not
had the occasion to make this decision in that the searches were
upheld in spite of Chimel.30
One court has applied a Linkletter form of "not yet final"
nonretroactivity: Chimel is applicable to cases pending on direct
review as of the date of its decision. 81
No appellate court at this time has directly held Chimel re-
troactive, but there have been cases so applying Chimel without
the issue of retroactivity being specifically considered, evidently
because the issue was not brought to the attention of the court. 2
27. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
28. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
29. United States v. Bennett, 415 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Valdes,
417 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1969) ; Lyon v. United States, 416 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Wil-
liams v. United States, 418 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1969) ; Whiteley v. Meacham, 416 F.2d 36
(10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Frazier, 304 F.Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1969); State v.
Bustamante, - Ariz.- , 462 P.2d 822 (1969) ; People v. Edwards, 80 Cal. Rptr. 638,
458 P.2d 713 (1969) ; Scott v. State, 7 Md. App. 505, 256 A.2d 384 (1969) ; People v. Her-
rera, 19 Mich. App. 216, 172 N.W.2d 529 (1969); Derouen v. Sheriff, Washoe County,
-Nev.- , 461 P.2d 865 (1969) ; People v. Lewis, 306 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1969).
30. See State v. Mitchell, -- Minn.- , 172 N.W.2d 66 (1969), inclined to find Chmel
nonretroactive; State v. Carter, 54 N.J. 436, 255 A.2d 746 (1969) where retroactive ap-
plication was also questioned.
31. Fresneda v. State, 458 P.2d 134 (1969).
32. See Steel v. State, - Ark.- , 450 S.W.2d 545 (1970) ; Fields v. State, 463 P.2d




However, there are some retroactive implications in the clari-
fication made of Preston. (See discussion of preceding question.)
DOES CHIMEL SERVE A "PURPOSE"?
There are many decisions of the Supreme Court that, in my
opinion, lack "realism." But if Chimel, and like decisions, can be
considered the start of a standard, and if the Supreme Court itself
can accept changes made by the majority of lower courts as they
seek to work out the impracticalities to achieve a "workable rule,"
then such decisions can be beneficial for all.
In summary, (1) as now construed, Chimel has the tendency to
make the arrest warrant superfluous. Harris and Rabinowitz in
volved arrest warrants. Giordenello v. United States"3 and Jaben
v. United States34 pointed out the need to specify the grounds for
arrest in the complaint as clearly as is necessary for the af-
fidavit used in obtaining a search warrant. In Chimel the arrest
warrant being invalid, and the Court, without deciding the question,
proceeded on the assumption that the California Court was cor-
rect in holding that the arrest was valid since reasonable grounds
existed although not enumerated. The Court could have required
arrest warrants in the same manner as search warrants, which
would seem to be more desirable than strengthening the require-
ments for search warrants. There could be limitations on searches
incident to arrests made without warrants (searches which are
subject to more abuse). If a search warrant is to be issued, there
will be a tendency to forget the arrest warrant altogether, because,
in addition to the grounds for issuance of a search warrant which
also may be sufficient to make the arrest, other evidence justifying
an arrest may be discovered. (2) Also to be considered is the
machinery needed to issue the warrant (as mentioned by Mr.
Justice Harlan in concurring). The policing of the police has the
limitations of the police themselves. They do act on the spur of
the moment. What is "exigent circumstances" to them may not
be to the Justices who have time to reflect. The Court's past state-
ments that the law enforcement officer need not be a "legal
technician" is no longer valid. We are not in a position to hold all
police officers to the same standard; e.g., an FBI agent who gener-
ally is a handpicked college graduate and, more often than not,
also a lawyer. And by limiting searches incident to arrest Chimel
will unnecessarily expand the need for search warrants. (3) There
are other means for measuring reasonableness of a search in-
cident to arrest. Kremen v. United States85 and James v. Louisi-
33. 857 U.S. 780 (1958).
24. 391 U.S. 214 (1965).
35. 253 U.S. 346 (1957).
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ana38 ' are examples of cases which noted the limits to which of-
ficers can go. Preston is another outstanding example, and-al-
though it was cited as a basis for Chime!, it should be noted that Mr.
Justice Black dissented in Chime! while writing the Preston
opinion. (4) It remains to be seen whether Chime! can inspire
more care in police officers to obtain search warrants and prepare
them properly under the rules already laid down in Aguilar v.
Texas3 7 and Spinelli v. United States 8 Which rules undoubtedly were
avoided to some extent by the incident to arrest route. It may well
be that search warrants, with their affidavits being in writing, will
bring out the best in police officers and thereby indirectly bene-
fit both the public as well as the individual searched, striking a
happy medium between what is "realistic" and what is "idealistic."
Even before the ink was dry on the above decisions of the lower courts, in
attempting to return Preston to what would seem to have been its proper place,
the Supreme Court, in Chambers v. Maroney, -U.S. - (1970), modified the
exigent circumstances of the automobile search, which must be taken as a new
rule of what constitutes "mobility" of the automobile. In Chambers the Court
considers it a reasonable decision to bring the automobile back to the police
station for search (the time lag not being disclosed) because of the arrest of the
occupants for robbery at night in a dark parking lot. Chambers is distinguished
from Preston on the basis of the arrest, in the latter case for vagrancy and in
the former for robbery. The robbery arrest in turn provided reasonable grounds
to search the automobile, in that evidence of the robbery (the guns and fruits
thereof) could reasonably be expected to be found in the automobile. This, of
course, would not be so for vagrancy. The "mobility" provides the exigent cir-
cumstances for the search. But "mobility" nevertheless remains the unclarified
factor in Chambers, in that all four occupants of the automobile were under ar-
rest and there seemed, as in Preston, to be no urgency since there was no one to
remove the automobile, and the police would undoubtedly be required to take pro-
tective measures for the automobile's safekeeping until its owner or someone des-
ignated by him was in a position to remove it. It can be readily understood that
if someone should call for the automobile, the police would then have the exigent
circumstance which would obviate the need for a warrant. If the Chambers Ex-
ception to Chimel is to be accepted at face value, Preston is very much modified
when an arrest is made for a crime in which an automobile might be viewed as
a depository of evidence (to be distinguished from vagrancy or traffic offense
arrests), rwith the limitation that the search be made within a "reasonably" short
interval of time after arrest and before "permanent" detention of the automobile
takes places.
36. 382 U.S. 36 (1965).
37. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
8. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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